Name: Moderate Realism and its Logic (en Inglés)
Price: 392.08 PEN
Availability: InStock
Author: D. W. Mertz; Donald W. Mertz
ISBN: 9780300065619

portada Moderate Realism and its Logic (en Inglés)

Formato

Libro Físico

Editorial

Yale University Press

Autor

D. W. Mertz; Donald W. Mertz

Año

1996

Idioma

Inglés

N° páginas

328

Encuadernación

Tapa Dura

ISBN

0300065612

ISBN13

9780300065619

Categorías

Tradiciones y escuelas de pensamiento

Moderate Realism and its Logic (en Inglés)

D. W. Mertz; Donald W. Mertz (Autor) · Yale University Press · Tapa Dura

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S/ 784,17

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Reseña del libro "Moderate Realism and its Logic (en Inglés)"

Instance ontology, or particularism―the doctrine that asserts the individuality of properties and relations―has been a persistent topic in Western philosophy, discussed in works by Plato and Aristotle, by Muslim and Christian scholastics, and by philosophers of both realist and nominalist positions. This book by D. W. Mertz is the first sustained analysis that applies the rules and systems of mathematics and logic to instance ontology in order to argue for its validity and for its problem-solving capacities and to associate it with a version of the realist position that Mertz calls "moderate realism." Mertz surveys the history of instance ontology in writings from Plato and Aristotle through Leibniz, followed by modern philosophers such as Bertrand Russell and D. M. Armstrong, among others. He also includes a thorough critique of the recent work of Keith Campbell and other contemporary nominalists. Building on the insights gained through this historical overview, he delves deeper into the logic of instance ontology and uncovers some of its extraordinary problem-solving features: distinguishing legitimate from illegitimate impredicative reasoning; uniformly diagnosing the self-referential paradoxes; being free from the limitation theorems of Gödel and Tarski; providing a basis for the derivation of arithmetic construed intensionally; and formally distinguishing identity and indiscernibility.