Name: Speech, Crime, and the Uses of Language (en Inglés)
Price: 650.44 PEN
Availability: InStock
Author: Kent Greenawalt
ISBN: 9780195077117

portada Speech, Crime, and the Uses of Language (en Inglés)

Formato

Libro Físico

Editorial

Oxford University Press

Autor

Kent Greenawalt

Año

1992

Idioma

Inglés

N° páginas

368

Encuadernación

Tapa Blanda

ISBN

0195077113

ISBN13

9780195077117

Categorías

Derecho constitucional

Speech, Crime, and the Uses of Language (en Inglés)

Kent Greenawalt (Autor) · Oxford University Press · Tapa Blanda

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S/ 1.300,87

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Origen: Estados Unidos (Costos de importación incluídos en el precio)

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Reseña del libro "Speech, Crime, and the Uses of Language (en Inglés)"

In this book Greenawalt explores the three-way relationship between the idea of freedom of speech, the law of crimes, and the many uses of language. He begins by considering free speech as a political principle, and after a thorough and incisive analysis of the justifications commonly advanced for freedom of speech, looks at the kinds of communications to which the principle of free speech applies. He then turns to an examination of communications for which criminal liability is fixed. Focusing on threats and solicitations to crime, Greenawalt attempts to determine whether liability for such communications seriously conflicts with freedom of speech. In the second half of the book he goes on to develop the significance of his conclusions for American constitutional law, addressing such questions as what should be considered "speech" within the meaning of the First Amendment, and what tests the courts should employ in deciding whether particular criminal statutes should be held constitutional. He concludes that the issues are too complex to yield simple solutions, and insists that the protection of the First Amendment can be reduced neither to one justification nor to one all-purpose test of coverage.