Name: The Political Economy of Democratic Institutions (The Locke Institute Series) (en Inglés)
Price: 286.00 PEN
Availability: InStock
Author: Peter Daniel Moser
ISBN: 9781858989662

portada The Political Economy of Democratic Institutions (The Locke Institute Series) (en Inglés)

Formato

Libro Físico

Editorial

Edward Elgar Publishing Ltd

Autor

Peter Daniel Moser

Categoría

Libros de Textos

Año

2000

Idioma

Inglés

N° páginas

208

Encuadernación

Tapa Dura

ISBN13

9781858989662

The Political Economy of Democratic Institutions (The Locke Institute Series) (en Inglés)

Peter Daniel Moser (Autor) · Edward Elgar Publishing Ltd · Tapa Dura

Libro Físico

S/ 286,00

S/ 571,99

Ahorras: S/ 286,00

50% descuento

Envío normal

Origen: Chile (Costos de importación incluídos en el precio)

Se enviará desde nuestra bodega entre el Miércoles 05 de Junio y el Martes 11 de Junio.

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Reseña del libro "The Political Economy of Democratic Institutions (The Locke Institute Series) (en Inglés)"

Majority rules are generally unstable and not binding for future voters, and so are insufficient for the required security of a market economy. In this challenging book, Peter Moser argues that stability can be achieved by democratic political institutions limiting the influence of majorities. Peter Moser examines the contribution to stable policy choices of a wide range of political institutions including constitutional rules, the organizational structure of legislatures and administrative and judicial procedures. He contributes new insights about the importance of decision rules in democracies by combining theory with empirical studies. He analyses legislative procedures in the US, the European Union and Switzerland, tests a novel explanation for central bank independence, discusses the implications of political decision rules for regulatory behavior, and provides a concise survey of recent critical research on democratic institutions. This book will be particularly welcomed by public choice scholars as well as other economists and political scientists interested in the role of democratic institutions.