Name: british generalship on the western front 1914-1918: defeat into victory (en Inglés)
Price: 796.70 PEN
Availability: InStock
Author: Robbins, Simon
ISBN: 9780415350068

portada british generalship on the western front 1914-1918: defeat into victory (en Inglés)

british generalship on the western front 1914-1918: defeat into victory (en Inglés)

Formato

Libro Físico

Autor

Simon Robbins

Editorial

Routledge

Año

2005

Idioma

Inglés

N° páginas

272

Encuadernación

Tapa Dura

Dimensiones

24.2 x 16.2 x 2.0 cm

Peso

0.57 kg.

ISBN

0415350069

ISBN13

9780415350068

Categorías

C. 1914-c. 1918 (período de la primera guerra mundial)
Guerra y defensa
Primera guerra mundial

british generalship on the western front 1914-1918: defeat into victory (en Inglés)

Simon Robbins (Autor) · Routledge · Tapa Dura

Más barato Libro Nuevo Importado

Envío: 19 a 25 días háb.

S/ 1.770,44S/ 796,70

-55%

Más rápido Libro Nuevo Importado

Envío: 10 a 14 días háb.

S/ 1.832,61S/ 824,68

-55%

Costos de importación incluídos en el precio ✅

Libro Nuevo Más barato

Quedan más de 100 unidades

S/ 796,70

Llega entre el 17 Ago y el 26 Ago a CERCADO DE LIMA, Lima. Seleccionar ubicación

Agregar a lista de deseos

Reseña del libro "british generalship on the western front 1914-1918: defeat into victory (en Inglés)"

This book explores the British Army's response on the Western Front to a period of seminal change in warfare. In particular it examines the impact of the pre-war emphasis on worldwide garrison, occupation and policing duties for the Empire's defence of the mindset of the Army's leadership and its lack of preparation for a continental war involving a massive, unplanned increase in men and material.The reasons for the poor performance in the early years of the war, notably professionalism within the British Army, including poor staff work, 'trade unionism', careerism within the high command, and the tendency of an overconfident hierarchy to ignore the need for reform to tackle the tactical stalemate prior to 1916, are analysed. The high command rapidly learnt from the defeats of 1915-16 and performed much better in 1916-18, an especially formative period resulting in the promotion of a younger, more professional leadership and the development of the first truly modern system of tactics which has dominated wars ever since. During 1917-18 the Army's commanders and staff evolved and improved these new methods; developing a doctrine of combined arms to overcome the tactical stalemate bedevilling Allied offensives.