Name: Choice: The Essential Element in Human Action (Routledge Library Editions: Free Will and Determinism) (en Inglés)
SKU: 51199674
Price: 204.83 PEN
Availability: InStock
Author: Alan Donagan
ISBN: 9781138704145

portada Choice: The Essential Element in Human Action (Routledge Library Editions: Free Will and Determinism) (en Inglés)

Choice: The Essential Element in Human Action (Routledge Library Editions: Free Will and Determinism) (en Inglés)

Formato

Libro Físico

Editorial

Routledge

Autor

Alan Donagan

Año

2018

Idioma

Inglés

N° páginas

210

Encuadernación

Tapa Blanda

ISBN13

9781138704145

N° edición

Categorías

Filosofía

Choice: The Essential Element in Human Action (Routledge Library Editions: Free Will and Determinism) (en Inglés)

Alan Donagan (Autor) · Routledge · Tapa Blanda

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Reseña del libro "Choice: The Essential Element in Human Action (Routledge Library Editions: Free Will and Determinism) (en Inglés)"

This book, first published in 1987, investigates what distinguishes the part of human behaviour that is action (praxis) from the part that is not. The distinction was clearly drawn by Socrates, and developed by Aristotle and the medievals, but key elements of their work became obscured in modern philosophy, and were not fully recovered when, under Wittgenstein’s influence, the theory of action was revived in analytical philosophy. This study aims to recover those elements, and to analyse them in terms of a defensible semantics on Fregean lines. Among its conclusions: that actions are bodily or mental events that are causally explained by their doers’ propositional attitudes, especially by their choices or fully specific intentions; that choice cannot be reduced to desire and belief, and hence that the traditional concept of will as intellectual appetite must be revived.