Name: Corps Level Operational Art in Vietnam: A Study of II Field Force Commanders During Major Named Operations (en Inglés)
Price: 81.58 PEN
Availability: InStock
Author: United States Army Command and General S
ISBN: 9781503189447

portada Corps Level Operational Art in Vietnam: A Study of II Field Force Commanders During Major Named Operations (en Inglés)

Corps Level Operational Art in Vietnam: A Study of II Field Force Commanders During Major Named Operations (en Inglés)

Formato

Libro Físico

Autor

United States Army Command and General S

Editorial

Createspace

Idioma

Inglés

N° páginas

Encuadernación

Tapa Blanda

Dimensiones

28.0 x 21.6 x 0.4 cm

Peso

0.20 kg.

ISBN13

9781503189447

Categorías

Vietnam
C. 1955-c. 1975 (época de la guerra de vietnam)
Historia militar: conflictos posteriores a la segunda guerra mundial

Corps Level Operational Art in Vietnam: A Study of II Field Force Commanders During Major Named Operations (en Inglés)

United States Army Command and General S (Autor) · Createspace · Tapa Blanda

Libro Nuevo Importado

Envío: 16 a 21 días háb.

S/ 181,28S/ 81,58

-55%

Costos de importación incluídos en el precio ✅

Libro Nuevo

Quedan 100 unidades

S/ 81,58

Llega entre el 21 Ago y el 31 Ago a CERCADO DE LIMA, Lima. Seleccionar ubicación

Agregar a lista de deseos

Reseña del libro "Corps Level Operational Art in Vietnam: A Study of II Field Force Commanders During Major Named Operations (en Inglés)"

This book explores two major U.S. operations and the reaction to one enemy offensive, in order to explore evidence of U.S. operational art in Vietnam. For the purpose of this study, the operational level is identified as the corps headquarters responsible for nesting Military Assistance Command-Vietnam's ( MACV) military guidance, the strategic direction issued by the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the national government's aims with the tactical maneuver of subordinate divisions and battalions. During the Vietnam War, the Field Force served as the equivalent of the corps headquarters. The three case studies analyzed are all drawn from II Field Force during the period 1967 to 1971. These case studies are OPERATION CEDAR FALLS/ JUNCTION CITY (1967), the 1970 U.S. incursion into Cambodia under OPERATION TOAN THANG, and II Field Force's reaction to the Tet offensive (1968). Through the analysis of the case studies, the question of operational art existing at the corps level during the Vietnam War is addressed, as is the identification of successful or unsuccessful leadership and staff practices faced in an asymmetric conflict.