Name: Crime and Culpability: A Theory of Criminal law (Cambridge Introductions to Philosophy and Law) (en Inglés)
SKU: 2123471
Price: 176.01 PEN
Availability: InStock
Author: Alexander, Larry ; Ferzan, Kimberly Kessler ; Morse, Stephen J.
ISBN: 9780521739610

portada Crime and Culpability: A Theory of Criminal law (Cambridge Introductions to Philosophy and Law) (en Inglés)

Crime and Culpability: A Theory of Criminal law (Cambridge Introductions to Philosophy and Law) (en Inglés)

Formato

Libro Físico

Autor

Larry Alexander

Kimberly Kessler Ferzan

Contribuciones de

Stephen J. Morse

Editorial

Cambridge University Press

Año

2009

Idioma

Inglés

N° páginas

372

Encuadernación

Tapa Blanda

Dimensiones

22.6x15x2.5 cm

Peso

0.50 kg.

ISBN

0521739616

ISBN13

9780521739610

N° edición

Categorías

Teoría general del derecho
Derecho y procedimiento penal

Crime and Culpability: A Theory of Criminal law (Cambridge Introductions to Philosophy and Law) (en Inglés)

Larry Alexander (Autor) · Kimberly Kessler Ferzan (Autor) · Stephen J. Morse (Contribuciones de) · Cambridge University Press · Tapa Blanda

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Reseña del libro "Crime and Culpability: A Theory of Criminal law (Cambridge Introductions to Philosophy and Law) (en Inglés)"

This book presents a comprehensive overview of what the criminal law would look like if organized around the principle that those who deserve punishment should receive punishment commensurate with, but no greater than, that which they deserve. Larry Alexander and Kimberly Kessler Ferzan argue that desert is a function of the actor's culpability, and that culpability is a function of the risks of harm to protected interests that the actor believes he is imposing and his reasons for acting in the face of those risks. The authors deny that resultant harms, as well as unperceived risks, affect the actor's desert. They thus reject punishment for inadvertent negligence as well as for intentions or preparatory acts that are not risky. Alexander and Ferzan discuss the reasons for imposing risks that negate or mitigate culpability, the individuation of crimes, and omissions. They conclude with a discussion of rules versus standards in criminal law and offer a description of the shape of criminal law in the event that the authors' conceptualization is put into practice.