Name: The Economics of Ottoman Justice: Settlement and Trial in the Sharia Courts (Cambridge Studies in Islamic Civilization) (en Inglés)
Price: 165.28 PEN
Availability: InStock
Author: Metin Coşgel
ISBN: 9781316610275

portada The Economics of Ottoman Justice: Settlement and Trial in the Sharia Courts (Cambridge Studies in Islamic Civilization) (en Inglés)

Formato

Libro Físico

Editorial

Cambridge University Press

Autor

Metin Coşgel

Año

2018

Idioma

Inglés

N° páginas

366

Encuadernación

Tapa Blanda

ISBN13

9781316610275

Categorías

Turquía
Imperio otomano
Historia de oriente próximo

The Economics of Ottoman Justice: Settlement and Trial in the Sharia Courts (Cambridge Studies in Islamic Civilization) (en Inglés)

Metin Coşgel (Autor) · Cambridge University Press · Tapa Blanda

Libro Nuevo

S/ 165,28

S/ 330,56

Ahorras: S/ 165,28

50% descuento

Envío normal

Origen: España (Costos de importación incluídos en el precio)

Se enviará desde nuestra bodega entre el Jueves 30 de Mayo y el Lunes 10 de Junio.

Lo recibirás en cualquier lugar de Perú entre 2 y 5 días hábiles luego del envío.

Reseña del libro "The Economics of Ottoman Justice: Settlement and Trial in the Sharia Courts (Cambridge Studies in Islamic Civilization) (en Inglés)"

During the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, the Ottoman Empire endured long periods of warfare, facing intense financial pressures and new international mercantile and monetary trends. The Empire also experienced major political-administrative restructuring and socioeconomic transformations. In the context of this tumultuous change, The Economics of Ottoman Justice examines Ottoman legal practices and the sharia court's operations to reflect on the judicial system and provincial relationships. Metin Coşgel and Boğaç Ergene provide a systematic depiction of socio-legal interactions, identifying how different social, economic, gender and religious groups used the court, how they settled their disputes, and which factors contributed to their success at trial. Using an economic approach, Coşgel and Ergene offer rare insights into the role of power differences in judicial interactions, and into the reproduction of communal hierarchies in court, and demonstrate how court use patterns changed over time.